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ABSTRACT This paper discusses selected dispositions and 
characteristics of the modern liberal/Cartesian subject observed 
in students’ responses to a survey on internationalization of 
higher education in Canada. The data on which this paper draws 
is part of a larger database of surveys, interviews, policy analyses 
and case studies that were developed within the framework of 
the Ethical Internationalization in Higher Education (EIHE) 
research project. The EIHE project was funded by the Finnish 
Academy of Science and was conducted between 2012-2016. 
This paper draws on three key findings from the responses of 
students (1451) of seven participating Canadian universities to 
present a broader (theoretical) context that could be inferred 
from what was observed in the data. For this purpose the paper 
first discusses some of the theories related to the existence 
and prevalence of the modern global imaginary that could be 
considered as a meta-framework under which such relations 
between the (modern) subject and his/her Other are normalized. 
In the next step it draws on psychoanalytical strands of decolonial 
and postcolonial critiques of the modern subject in an attempt 
to sketch some of problematic (and often unacknowledged) 
characteristics of the modern liberal/Cartesian subject that 
lead to constant re-production of binary hierarchical relations 
grounded on epistemic violence and privilege.
Key words: modern subject, internationalization of higher 
education, epistemic violence, commodification of difference.
1. The EIHE survey project 
The reflections in this paper were inspired by the analysis of 
student responses to a survey on internationalization of higher 
education that was developed and administered within the 
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Ethical Internationalization in Higher Education (EIHE) research 
project. This project was funded by the Finnish Academy of 
Science and the surveys were collected between 2013–2015. 
This paper draws on the responses to the survey (n=1451) from 
students of seven Canadian universities. 
                                                                              
Although this paper reflects on data from Canadian 
universities its ambition is not to outline a country-specific profile 
of students and their dispositions towards internationalization, 
diversity and global citizenship. Rather, it attempts to use the 
examples from data as points of entry into deeper engagement 
with (critical) theory on some of the more visible general 
tendencies and characteristics that could be considered as 
constitutive elements of the modern liberal/Cartesian subject. 
For this particular purpose the paper discusses the findings 
from the analysis of the open-ended part of the questionnaire 
that collected students’ responses to four main questions:
1. How does internationalization affect society in general?
2. How do you imagine global citizens should think, relate and/
or act in the world?
3. Apart from language difficulties, do international students 
or students with diverse background face challenges in your 
institution? Please explain your answer.
4. Can diversity enrich your university experience? Please 
explain your answer.
Reflections in this paper stem from a selection of findings 
and observations from a broader and more comprehensive 
analysis of the data (see Suša, 2016) that explored exceptionalist 
tendencies and articulation in students’ responses. This broader 
research adopted a mixed-methods (Biesta, 2010, Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004) approach to the analysis of quantitative 
and qualitative data, grounded in multiple disciplines of critical 
scholarship (e.g. Balibar, 1991, Bhabha, 1994, Bonilla-Silva, 
2006, Jefferess, 2008, Kapoor, 2014, Thobani, 2007, Zizek, 
1997 and others). Standard tools for statistical analysis were 
used for examining quantitative date, while social cartography 
(Paulston, 1996, 1999, Paulston & Liebman, 1994) was used in 
the analysis of the qualitative data.     
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The research’s ambition was to use social cartography 
as a performative, post-representational tool for analysis and 
clustering of qualitative data into non-normative categories. 
Such an approach makes possible a mutual comparison between 
different discursive orientations and their interstices – in the data 
observed – without claiming normative ‘objectivity’. Two sets of 
analytical matrices were developed that produced two separate 
mappings. The first cartography clustered data according 
to three main discursive orientations (liberal, neoliberal, 
critical) and their interstices, while the second cartography 
mapped different dispositions and tendencies of Canadian 
exceptionalism. A visual image of the first (general) cartography 
is reproduced in Figure 1 below, while the presentation and 
discussion of the second (more specific) cartography is omitted 
due to spatial concerns. As the first cartography was deployed 
with the purpose of mapping general discursive orientations 
and their interstices, the findings discussed here are largely 
drawn from the use of this cartography.
Fig. 1 Main EIHE social cartography (Andreotti et al., 2016, 91. Reproduced 
under Creative Commons Attribution Licence 4.0)
The conceptualization of these different discursive 
orientations and their interstices has been discussed in more 
detail elsewhere (see Andreotti et al., 2016, Suša, 2016), 
but, in brief, a neoliberal orientation refers to positionalities 
(and students answers) that emphasize the benefits of 
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internationalization and increased diversity (of student 
population and teaching staff) as contributing positively to 
economic growth and to students’ opportunities for career (and 
personal) development. 
                                       
A liberal discursive orientation refers to notions of 
internationalization and global citizenship that emphasizes (a 
need for) increased tolerance, acceptance, and respect of human 
rights, social inclusion and non-discrimination, among other 
social or public-benefit oriented propositions. Both liberal and 
neoliberal orientations emphasize the importance of individual 
agency over systemic change. Answers mapped as belonging 
under a critical orientation would exhibit, to varying extent, an 
understanding of global power relations, structural injustices, 
systemic discrimination and personal complicity in systemic 
harm. 
Answers at the intersections of these main orientations 
would be mapped as belonging to either neoliberal-liberal, 
liberal-critical, neoliberal-critical or neoliberal-liberal-critical 
interstices. Answers in the neoliberal-liberal interstice would 
combine notions of individual (personal) and social (public) 
benefit, while the answers in the three critical interstices 
would indicate a recognition of various forms of discriminatory 
practices, related to internationalization and increased diversity 
of student population. However those would be interpreted as 
either generally attributable to ‘misbehaviour of mal-adjusted 
individuals’ (liberal-critical interstice), as oppression of the 
majority population by the minorities (neoliberal-critical) or 
as an internally contested combination of the two (neoliberal-
liberal-critical). In the mapping, the main difference between 
a mainly critical orientation and these three interstices 
was drawn according to the visible recognition of structural 
(systemic) inequalities, discrimination, personal complicity and 
vested power relations. In all three interstices (liberal-critical, 
neoliberal-critical, liberal-neoliberal-critical) there was no 
visible recognition of power relations, structural inequalities 
and/or personal complicity. These were however observable (in 
varying degrees) in the answers that were mapped under the 
mainly critical orientation. 
                                                            
The answers that could be mapped as belonging either 
to a liberal, neoliberal main orientation or, alternatively, to 
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the neoliberal liberal interstice comprised the overwhelming 
majority (between 61 and 88 %) of all answers, while answers 
that were mapped as ‘critical’ were found in less than 5 % of all 
cases (to all four questions). Answers considered as belonging to 
either a liberal-critical or a neoliberal-liberal-critical interstice 
accounted for the rest.1   
                                                       
While these numbers can give us an initial rough impression 
as to which main orientations and interstices could be considered 
as the most dominant and which as the most under-represented 
in students’ responses, there are certain other observations that 
are more pertinent to the subject of this paper. Before proceeding 
with the discussion about these other observations, I would 
wish to emphasize that the analysis adopted in this research 
argues for a post-representational reading of the engagement 
with data that is interested in mobilizing different relationships 
with the production of knowledge, rather than attempting to 
claim ‘objective neutrality’. Indeed, one of the cartographies 
that was used for a deeper analysis of data was conceptualized 
as a 
mirror that denaturalizes what is perceived as normal 
and desirable and amplifies unflattering traits in 
order to open possibilities for different conversations 
and to make visible otherwise hidden assumptions 
and interpretations (Suša, 2016, p. 287).
In this regard this paper aims to follow de Sousa Santos’s 
proposition that in an ecology of knowledges, “knowledge-as-
intervention-in-reality is the measure of realism, not knowledge-
as-a-representation-of-reality” (Sousa Santos, 2015, p. 201). 
Further, Sousa Santos argues that the credibility of cognitive 
construction (i.e. knowledge production) “is measured by the 
type of intervention in the world that it affords or prevents” 
(ibid). Sousa Santos also makes a very clear distinction between 
“analytic objectivity” and “political neutrality”, and while I will 
attempt to comply with the requirements of the first by making 
my interpretative rationales as clearly explicated as possible, I 
do not believe that attempting to achieve “political neutrality”, 
is in any way desirable or even possible.
1 For a more nuanced analysis see Suša (2016).
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Indeed, I believe that is precisely the very ideas or 
possibility of neutrality, normative ‘objectivity’ and epistemic 
innocence, related to the logocentric tendencies of the liberal/
Cartesian subject, that deserve to be seriously questioned and 
deconstructed, as they can be found at the very heart of what 
Balibar (1991) and Maldonado-Torres (2004, 2007) refer to as 
epistemic or academic racism.
 
Observations from the data 
The first observation from the data is related to a finding 
that across all three main orientations and their respective 
interstices the students responses seemed to construct an 
image of a particular kind of relationship towards their Other(s) 
(international students, migrants, people from minority 
communities) that seemed to be predominantly predicated 
upon their possession of knowledge about these Other(s).2 
In the responses the Other(s) were largely constructed as a 
(homogenized and/or essentialized) category, and the underlying 
assumptions in these answers seemed to be that establishing 
(at least provisionally equivocal) relations between students and 
their Others required first an increased understanding about 
each other.  
                                 
While such an observation may be at first sight considered 
‘normal’ or ‘unremarkable’, as we generally find people from 
similar background as more easily ‘relatable’, this research 
is committed to exploring precisely these unremarkable 
‘normalities’ that could be considered as indicative of larger, 
very widely shared patterns of dispositions, assumptions and 
beliefs that may seem to be universal in value due to their 
omnipresence. However, authors such as Mignolo (2002) and 
Quijano (1999) would argue that the problem of the continuation 
of coloniality (or colonial dispositions) lies precisely in the ways 
how (once) local (Western, Enlightenment-based) structures of 
being came to be seen as universal through centuries of colonial 
subjugation.
2 Although this research uses the concepts of the subject and his/her 
Other, these two concepts should not considered as necessarily (or at all) 
ontologically or epistemically distinction. Those individuals and groups 
that are in the students responses constructed as different as Others 
may well share many (if not all) of the students’ existential propositions 
– as part of the same widely shared forms of modern liberal/Cartesian 
subjectivity.
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Answers such as: “The more perspectives people are 
exposed to the more tolerant and open-minded they will be, 
allowing society to move to a more egalitarian society”, “People 
get chances to experience other cultures and gain knowledge. 
By sharing cultural values, goals and practices countries can 
become more familiar with each other and unite as a whole” or “I 
think it’s important to learn from other cultures. Especially as a 
teacher being knowledgeable about other cultures is important 
for making all students feel welcome” could be considered 
as indicative of a disposition that requires a possession of 
knowledge of Other(s) before engaging in (less hierarchical) 
relations with them.
In many of these responses, the students did not seem to be 
interested into getting to know (about) actual people – they were 
rather much more interested in learning about their culture. 
In this regard such answers could be considered as indicative 
of what Balibar (1991) refers to as differential or alternatively 
cultural racism, where culture replaces nature as the explanatory 
principle for racialized differentiation. Regardless of whether it 
is nature (biology), culture, ethnicity or any other differentiating 
principle, the relationship between the subject and its Other 
remains constructed through essentialized knowledge about 
the Other.
In this relationship the subject remains in the position of 
epistemic privilege that allows him/her to be the one doing the 
knowing. The Other is alternatively constructed as a (passive) 
subject to be known, or subjected to the dominant subject’s gaze. 
I believe that it is important to emphasize that this “will to know, 
a violent desire for immediate knowledge of social relations” 
(Balibar, 1991, p. 19) is not necessarily exercised with the purpose 
of denigrating the Other. It rather seems to be oriented towards 
increasing the subject’s capacity for inclusion, acceptance and 
tolerance, thus affirming his/her superiority through elevation 
of his/her moral and ethical status. The research attempted 
to conceptualize two categories of responses (relational-liberal 
and relational-critical) that would be marked by the primacy 
of relationality before knowledge and by a recognition of an 
existential re-orientation that challenges the onto-epistemic 
ground of the dominant liberal / Cartesian subject. However, 
less than 1 % of all answers could be considered as (potentially) 
indicative of such orientations.
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The second observation is related to the ways in which 
students constructed both themselves and their Other(s), in 
other words what kind of difference was constructed in students’ 
responses. In general it was possible to observe that students 
would predominantly describe themselves, the institutions they 
were in, or the Canadian society in general as open, tolerant, 
welcoming, benevolent and accepting. Answers such as: “Canada 
is accepting of all cultures and we are essentially known for 
that. It’s good to know people from around the World”, “We are 
very accepting. We are already diverse, so visitors normally find 
people they can easily relate to” or “I am Canadian, but view 
myself as being open minded and accepting toward other nations 
/ cultures” could be considered as indicative of this stance. 
Although the particular notion of Canada or Canadianness 
as a self-explanatory principle for the subjects’ inherent 
human(ist) virtues is considered as one of the defining traits 
of Canadian exceptionalism (see Thobani, 2007, Jefferess 
2008, 2011 Suša, 2016), the notions of personal innocence and 
benevolence should hardly be taken as an exclusively Canadian 
trait, albeit they may be more pronounced in the Canadian 
context. Inversely, the Other(s) were in students’ responses 
often constructed as somehow lacking, inferior, even violent or 
ungrateful (for the offered acceptance and tolerance). Answers, 
such as: “Most of the international students that I have met do 
not attempt to make conversation despite the efforts of myself 
and my friends. We try to get to know them, but they don’t 
make the effort to know us”, “Some students are not willing to 
socialize and step out of their comfort level, leaving them to stick 
with only other international students”, or “Different cultural 
beliefs can be ‘backwards’ or ‘opposite’ from the majority and 
cause conflicts” might illustrate this disposition. 
Such constructions are consistent with Bhabha’s (1994) 
proposition that the subject (or more precisely the subjects’ self) 
and his/her Other are always constructed in an ambivalent 
relationship where the Other is repeatedly constructed as both 
an innocent and helpless victim in need of salvation (thus 
offering the subject a chance at redemption), and at the same 
time as constant threat (to the subject’s privileged position).  
The third observation is related to indications of a 
commodified nature of the relation between the subject and his/
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her Other(s). In several answers it was possible to observe how 
the Other(s) got constructed in relation to the perceived value 
they can contribute to subject’s (or alternatively the nation’s) 
project of self-actualization and personal growth. Answers 
such as: “More than half the friends I made are international 
students. They are amazing people and will definitely change 
the world. Being with them helps you reach your potential and 
goals in life”, “I take every encounter as an opportunity to grow 
and learn; this is especially possible when the people I interact 
with are different from myself in terms of ethnical background”, 
or “It must be difficult to find yourself in a completely different 
context among people who have probably been socialized in a 
different way.  
 It is important for these international students to remember 
that their perspectives provide a refreshing change of scenery 
for other students”, could be considered as indicative of this 
commodified disposition. It could be argued that an observable 
lack of the capacity to examine one’s own onto-epistemic 
grounds could be seen as reflected in these unproblematic 
and non-challenging conceptualization of diversity/difference, 
where the Other’s difference is largely understood as mere 
addition rather than as a potential disruptions of the subject’s 
existing knowledge. Further, such a disposition seems to re-
affirm a notion that the Other only deserves to be included (or 
engaged with) as long as his/her difference does not threaten 
the onto-epistemic security of the subject. When the Other 
refuses to ‘play by the book’, when he/she refuses to have his/
her difference made available for the subject’s consumption 
and personal self-development, this failure to comply with 
the subject’s demand to have his/her epistemic privilege re-
affirmed, would likely result in the vilification of the Other – as 
discussed above. 
In the next sections of this article I present a broader 
(theoretical) context that could be inferred from the observations 
presented so far. For this I first outline some of the theories 
related to the existence and prevalence of the modern global 
imaginary that could be considered as a meta-framework 
under which such relations between the (modern) subject 
and his/her Other are normalized. In the next step I draw on 
psychoanalytical, decolonial and post-colonial critiques of the 
modern subject in attempt to sketch some of problematic (and 
202
often unacknowledged) characteristics of the modern liberal/
Cartesian subject that lead to constant re-production of binary 
hierarchical relations grounded on epistemic violence and 
privilege.
2. The dominant modern global imaginary
According to Scott (1999), the questions we ask are situated 
and contingent and they need to be understood in relation to 
cognitive-political spatial temporalities that are dynamic in 
nature (see also Andreotti 2014). Scott proposes that we need 
not only a reading of the past to better understand the present, 
but also a reading of the present to re-evaluate the demands for 
the future. For him, this reading is an articulation of a ‘problem 
space’, which he defines as “conceptual-ideological ensembles, 
discursive formations and language games” (Scott, 1999, 4). 
Scott (2004) argues that the delineation of problem spaces 
helps historicize both our questions and our answers and 
shows that, depending of where we come from, our perspective, 
priorities, questions and answers will change. My reading of 
Scott is that both our questions and our answers should always 
be considered as inhabiting a historically and socio-politically 
constructed space, meaning that they should never be taken at 
face value, but always in relation to the particularities of their 
context.    
                                                                                      
Similarly, Bhabha (1994) and Mignolo (2002) assert that 
our ‘locus of enunciation’ makes a difference in the kind of 
knowledge production that we happen to engage in. Ever since 
the psychoanalytical turn in critical theory, several authors 
(Lasch, 1991, Bhabha, 1994, Kapoor, 2014, Seshadri-Crooks, 
2002, Zizek, 1985, 1989, 1991 and others) have argued from 
various standpoints that the modern (political) subject should 
not be considered as a rational, self-transparent, autonomous 
individual, but rather as a complex, often self-unaware subject, 
mostly driven by unconscious desires, attachments and 
fantasies.
In order to respond to these propositions, this paper tries 
to make ‘the locus of enunciation’ visible. It could be argued 
that ‘the loci of enunciation’ of one (the author) and the other 
(the students) are significantly different, shaped by very 
different patterns of socialization and by significantly different 
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experiences of life in Central Europe (the author) and in Canada 
(the students). As such, they might seem to be separated not 
just by considerable temporal, geographical, historical and 
ideological disjunctions, but also by differences of professional 
and personal dispositions and interests. However, regardless 
of these potential differences, they could also be considered 
as framed within a generally shared and widespread modern 
global imaginary (Steger, 2008, see also Andreotti et al., 2016, 
Stein and Andreotti, 2016, Stein et al., 2016) that cuts across 
these many differences. This global imaginary refers to the way 
we imagine, or construct, the normality of relations between 
different groups of people, cultures, and states, and the 
projected, normalized expectations about the nature of these 
relations on a global scale.
It is an anthropocentric, logocentric, hierarchical, 
patriarchal, racialized, heteronormative imaginary that 
elevates certain groups of people, depending on their origin and 
social status, as fit for leading humanity, and others as fit for 
following that lead. It is related to specific and singular ideas 
about progress, development and human evolution (Andreotti 
2016) that have historic roots in European colonial expansion 
and in the European Enlightenment movement, and that have 
– through multiple forms of (neo)colonial violence now widely 
spread across the world.3
For Steger the global imaginary “is nobody’s exclusive 
property. It inhabits class, race, and gender, but belongs to 
none of these” (Steger, 2008, p. IX). Steger suggests that the 
modern global imaginary frames and circumscribes the way we 
imagine our relations as well as our past, our present and our 
future – irrespective of our background. Although we may be 
prone to challenge it, our a priori position in the world is already 
determined by it, and perhaps more importantly, it is being 
determined globally. Similarly to the way this global imaginary 
structurally elevates certain groups of people above others, it 
3 Although Steger (2008) traces the origins of the global imaginary to the 
Enlightenment period and Destutt de Tracy’s work on ideology (in the late 
18th/early 19th century), other authors (e.g. Dussel et al., 2000 , Mignolo, 
2002, Stein and Andreotti, 2016) have argued that its origin (or more 
precisely the origin of modernity) could be followed much further back in 
history – at the very least to the period of Hispanic colonial expansion at 
the turn of the15th century. 
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also elevates certain knowledges (epistemologies) and ways of 
being (ontologies) as superior to others.
Within the EIHE project and for the purpose of this inquiry, 
this modern global/colonial imaginary is conceptualized as a 
meta-narrative that “naturalizes Western/European domination 
and capitalist, colonial social relations and projects a local 
(Western/European) perspective as a universal blueprint for 
imagined global designs” (Andreotti et al., 2016, p. 88). Drawing 
on the works of scholars who criticize the presumption of a 
single, unilineal path of human (social) progress, development 
and evolution and the ensuing epistemic violence that results 
from this presumption (Grosfoguel, 2012, 2013, Kapoor, 2014, 
Mignolo, 2007, 2011, de Souza Santos 2007), this paper 
concurs with the approach of such authors  in considering 
this imaginary as contested, and certainly contestable, but 
nevertheless widespread, and generally upheld across the 
globe.
Although subject to the criticism of conflating colonial and 
anti-colonial imaginaries under one common denominator (see 
Kamola, 2014), Steger’s notion of a global imaginary “that finds 
its political articulation in the ideological claims of contemporary 
social elites who reside in the privileged spaces of our global 
cities and also fuels the hopes, disappointments, and demands 
of migrants who traverse national boundaries in search of their 
piece of the global promise” remains a useful concept, especially 
when discussing the subject of internationalization (of higher 
education) (Steger, 2008, p. IX).4 In particular this refers to the 
unexamined and seldom challenged notions of global university 
rankings that explicitly profile certain universities as ‘better’ 
than others – a notion that many students are quite eager to 
buy into.
The “global promise” in this regard is that a graduate 
or postgraduate degree from one of the higher ranking 
universities will provide the students with better opportunities 
for employment and career development, thus increasing their 
chances for social mobility and existential stability. To what 
4 A more nuanced critique of how Steger renders elites culpable for the spread of the 
global imaginary could be developed through the works of Žižek (1997) and Balibar 
(1991). 
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extent (and for which groups of students) these promises still 
hold is subject to further debate.
It may be argued that what Kamola calls Steger’s 
“undervalue[ing] of the very real contradictions, tensions, 
exclusions, violence, and class struggles that defined colonial 
rule and its resistances” could be taken as a certain kind of 
proof its dominant nature (Kamola, 2014, p. 7). By this I mean 
that the notion of global could be considered as referring to 
an understanding that even resistance strategies and struggles 
against the global imaginary are already shaped and infused 
by it. If these resistance struggles were to avail themselves of 
the use of referents and signifiers that are outside of the global 
imaginary, then they would cease to be intelligible, or seen as 
meaningful and relevant, to those within it. It may be that from 
within the imaginary they would likely not be considered as 
resistance at all.
The key assumption here is that any political struggle 
against an imaginary (global or not) is already always defined 
and circumscribed by the very imaginary one struggles against. 
A psychoanalytical reading of this relationship between the 
subject of critique and the critique itself would emphasize the 
mutual co-constitution of the two. Zizek for instance, offers an 
example of “the ascetic, who exhibits his dependence on the 
material world by his very obsession with getting rid of it” to 
illustrate this point. (Zizek, 1991, p. 149) Steger develops his 
conceptualization of the global imaginary by drawing on Taylor’s 
understanding of social imaginaries as
the ways people “imagine” their social existence, how 
they fit together with others, how things go between 
and their fellows, the expectations that are normally 
met and the deeper normative notions and images 
that underlie these expectations (Taylor, 2004, p. 23).
Taylor’s understanding of social imaginaries is taken here as 
reference to a framework that delineates and circumscribes 
our spontaneous, normalized relationship to the world 
and the people around us. In the last part of this paper, I 
explore what kind of normalized assumptions, dispositions 
and tendencies of the modern liberal/Cartesian subject have 
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historically emerged under the framework of the dominant 
global imaginary. I offer some insight into the question of 
how these dispositions and tendencies get reproduced 
and/or contested in students’ responses to the survey on 
internationalization. 
3. The modern liberal/Cartesian subject
In their discussions on different kinds of constitutive violence(s) 
that accompany the unfolding of modernity, authors, such 
as Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2004, 2007), Walter Mignolo 
(2002, 2007, 2011), Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2001, 2007, 
2015), Gayatri Spivak (2002, 2011) and others have explored 
how the continuation of colonial logic through patterns of 
hegemonic (institutionalized) knowledge production serves as 
the underlying onto-epistemic ground for the continuation of 
modernity’s multiple violences. Mignolo argues that a strategy 
of de-linking with the project modernity and its constituent – 
coloniality, primarily through the decolonization of knowledge, 
would involve a
constant double movement of unveiling the geo-
political location of theology, secular philosophy and 
scientific reason and simultaneously affirming the 
modes and principles of knowledge that have been 
denied by the rhetoric of Christianization, civilization, 
progress, development, market democracy (Mignolo, 
2007, p. 463).
For Mignolo, (Christian) theology, secular philosophy and 
scientific (instrumental) reason constitute the “three macro-
narratives of Western civilization” that could likewise be 
considered as the three pillars of modernity. (Mignolo, 2007, p. 
455) Similarly Stein and Andreotti (forthcoming) identify global 
capital, the nation-state and humanism as the key actants in 
the history of colonial violence. For Mignolo:
Time and [colonial] history allowed global designs to 
emerge (religious, economic, social and epistemic) 
as responses to the need of a given place that 
were assumed to have universal value across time 
and space. […] However, this project is no longer 
convincing. (Mignolo, 2002, p. 69)
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de Sousa Santos  argues that modernity has created a particular 
form of subjectivity, characterized by what he refers to as 
abyssal thinking:
Modern Western thinking is an abyssal thinking. It 
consists of a system of visible and invisible distinctions, 
the invisible ones being the foundation of the visible 
ones. The division is such that ‘the other side of the 
line’ vanishes as reality becomes nonexistent, and 
is indeed produced as non-existent. […] What most 
fundamentally characterizes abyssal thinking is thus 
the impossibility of the co-presence of the two sides 
of the line. To the extent that it prevails, this side 
of the line only prevails by exhausting the field of 
relevant reality. Beyond it, there is only nonexistence, 
invisibility, non-dialectical absence (de Sousa Santos, 
2007, p. 45).
Further, de Sousa Santos suggests that the modern Cartesian 
subject is not merely incapable of establishing equivocal relations 
– that is, acknowledging the value, relevance and importance 
of non-Enlightenment ways of knowing (epistemologies) and 
being (ontologies), but that this subject’s dispositions towards 
these other ways are actively rendering them invisible and non-
existent. This process is not conscious (as other authors below 
labour to show), but it is nevertheless constitutive for both – the 
modern subject’s existence and the other’s suppression into 
non-dialectical absence.
Mignolo (2002) uses Ramonet’s concept of la pensée 
unique and Marcusean notion of one-dimensional man to refer 
to a very similar notion of totalizing (or totalitarian) forms of 
knowledge production that constructs a particular kind of 
subject – considered as in possession of universal (totalizing) 
knowledge. Mignolo traces the origins of dominance of Western 
epistemology to the period of transition between Theo-logy to 
secular Ego-logy (referring to the Cartesian “I think, therefore I 
am”) and he makes quite clear that for him la pensee unique is: 
Western in toto, that is, liberal and neo-liberal but also 
Christian and neo-Christian, as well as Marxist and 
neo-Marxist. La pensee unique is the totality of the 
three major macro-narratives of Western civilization 
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with its imperial languages (English, German, French, 
Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese) and their Greco 
and Roman foundations (Mignolo, 2007, pp. 455, 
456).
I believe that Mignolo is trying to draw our attention to the 
fact that many forms of critique are built upon very similar 
epistemic and ontological assumptions. Maldonado-Torres 
(2004) speaks of epistemologies of ignorance, will-to-ignorance 
and forgetfulness of coloniality in his discussion of how Western 
philosophy and contemporary social theory (including the 
authors that scholars draw on – most notably Zizek) all too 
often remain silent on the subject of coloniality and how by not 
discussing this subject they remain implied in its continuation. 
This forgetfulness could be related to Cartesian subject’s 
doubt or “scepticism regarding the humanity of the enslaved 
and colonized sub-others [that] stands at the background of the 
Cartesian certainties and his methodic doubt” (Maldonando-
Torres, 2007, p. 245).  Drawing on Dussel, Maldonado-Torres 
(ibid) argues that the Cartesian ego cogito was historically 
preceded by the colonial ego conquiro and that if we are trying 
to understand how Cartesian form of subjectivity emerge, we 
must examine its origin against this colonial backdrop. In 
his words, “the practical conquering self and the theoretical 
thinking substance are parallel in terms of their [epistemic] 
certainty” (Maldonando-Torres, 2004, p. 245).
Maldonado-Torres discusses how the interplay between 
certainty and doubt produces the binary hierarchical relation 
between the self and the other. Thus the certainty of the 
conquering self (about the justifiability of his actions and 
violence) could only be possible through simultaneous projection 
of doubt about the humanity of the subjugated others. Similarly 
the Cartesian certainty about cogito is established against its 
methodological doubt about what may be merely an illusion of 
the external world (res extensa):
The Cartesian idea about the division between res 
cogitans and res extensa (consciousness and matter) 
which translates itself into a divide between the mind 
and the body or between the human and nature is 
preceded and even, one has the temptation to say, to 
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some extent built upon an anthropological colonial 
difference between the ego conquistador and the ego 
conquistado (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p. 245).
For Maldonado-Torres the modern colonial subject is constituted 
by an imperial attitude that is permanently sceptical about the 
humanity of the other, and always certain about the humanity 
of the self. Maldonado-Torres refers to this disposition as 
misanthropic scepticism of the modern subject:
Misanthropic skepticism doubts in a way the most 
obvious. Statements like ‘you are a human’ take 
the form of cynical rhetorical questions: Are you 
completely human? ‘You have rights’ becomes ‘why 
do you think that you have rights?’ Likewise ‘You are 
a rational being’ takes the form of the question ‘are 
you really rational?’ Misanthropic skepticism is like a 
worm at the very heart of modernity. The achievements 
of the ego cogito and instrumental rationality operate 
within the logic that misanthropic skepticism helped 
to establish (ibid). 
However, Lacan, and consequently Zizek (1991, 2000) have 
questioned the ontological certainty of the Cartesian cogito 
by arguing that – contrary to Descartes’ understanding, the 
cogito is the subject of the unconscious. Summarizing Lacan’s 
Seminar XI, Zizek  argues that because:
the terms of the cogito are defined by a forced choice 
between thought and being he [Lacan] now claims 
that the subject is condemned to a choice of being. 
[…] Lacan’s new paraphrase of cogito ergo sum is 
therefore: I (the subject) as in so far as it (Es, the 
Unconscious) thinks. The Unconscious is literally the 
“thing which thinks” and as such inaccessible to the 
subject: in so far as I am, I am never where “it thinks” 
(Zizek, 1991, p. 147).
Although the statement above could be interpreted as 
suggesting that the Cartesian subject is thus liberated from 
the determinism of (presumably universal) rational thought, 
Zizek (ibid.) is quick to point out that “the being chosen by the 
subject has of course its support in fantasy: the choice of being 
210
is the choice of fantasy which produces frame and consistency 
to what we call ‘reality’, whereas the ‘unconscious’ designates 
scraps of knowledge which subverts this fantasy frame.” In 
other words: “as a subject, I never am where I think” (Zizek 
1991, p. 148). While the intricacies of Lacanian understanding 
of the Cartesian subject would far exceed the purpose of 
this paper, one could argue that perhaps the most relevant 
insight for the ensuing discussion is that regardless of one’s 
assumptions of self-transparency, coherence and capacity 
for deliberate, rational choice, the Cartesian subject is much 
guided by a logocentric fantasy, whereby his descriptions (or 
assumptions about) reality get conflated with reality itself. This 
has important ramifications for the subject’s self-perceptions 
and the constructions of his/her self-image, as well as for the 
ways the subject imagines his/her others. 
 
Several authors that have explored the complexities and 
ambivalences of the relationship between the modern subject 
and his/her others (e.g. Ahmed, 2000, Bhabha, 1994, McAllan, 
2014, Thobani, 2007) would argue that in order for the modern 
Cartesian/liberal subject to maintain his ontological security 
(certainty), (epistemic) privilege and resulting affirmation of his/
her superiority, the other has to be constructed as permanently 
lacking, undeserving and inferior. Drawing similarly on Lacan, 
Bhabha (1994) argues that what threatens the modern subject 
most, is the potential equality of the other. This superiority of 
the other is (within a liberal imaginary) constructed through 
narratives about the subjects’ many (humanistic) virtues, 
such as: openness, tolerance, acceptance, non-discrimination, 
compassion, benevolence, innocence and extolment of other, 
inherently positive virtues.
The superiority of the modern Cartesian/liberal subject 
is thus no longer affirmed through the sheer force of colonial 
conquest and subjugation (as in Maldonado-Torres’s ego 
conquiro), but rather inversely through an emphasis on the 
subjects’ capacity and commitment to social inclusion and 
acceptance. However, in order for the subject to keep his/her 
elevated position, the nature of this relationship has to be denied 
and fundamentally suppressed. As the subject’s phenomenal 
experience is inaccessible to our attempts to bring such notions 
to light (to the level conscious cognitive engagement) it will 
likely contribute very little to their disruption as we simply 
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derive too much enjoyment (jouissance) from this double-bind. 
Zizek (1991) and others (e.g. Lacan, 2000, McGowan, 2004, 
Kapoor, 2014) have argued persuasively that we often enjoy 
the most precisely in the things that are forbidden and/or 
transgressive.
In order to protect one’s positive self-imagine and to 
continue to enjoy in the privilege of constructed (or imagined) 
ethical/moral superiority, certain protective mechanisms, 
such as denial (Bonilla-Silva, 2006, Mignolo, 2011, Zizek, 
1991), autoimmunity (Derrida, 2005, McAllan, 2014) and willful 
ignorance (Maldonado-Torres, 2004, Tuana, 2004) can be 
deployed to enable the subject to persist in his/her self-centred 
fantasy. In this regard any attempts to disrupt the subject’s onto-
epistemic privilege are highly likely going to be perceived either 
as yet another ‘resource’ (or therapy) to be appropriated and 
cannibalized (McAllan, 2014); or as very dangerous existential 
threat, that has to be removed and/or rendered ‘safe’.
4. Where from here?
In order to interrupt our satisfaction (Biesta 2013) with our 
socially constructed narrativization of the world, where our 
multiple privileges are disguised through notions of ‘normalcy’, 
benevolence, innocence and deservedness, it will likely take 
much more than a mere cognitive attempt at describing and 
critiquing one’s position. Lacan and Zizek have shown that 
the modern Cogito is simply not in the position where it would 
be able deconstruct itself. Similarly, de Souza Santos (2007) 
explains that crossing the abyssal line within the hegemonic 
imaginary that is being constructed through modernity’s 
project is not possible due to modernity’s constitutive denial 
of existence of anything beyond the abyss. This means that 
however hard we may try to struggle to dismantle modernity’s 
inherent violence we remain bound in what Andreotti et al. 
(2015) refer to as metaphysical entrapment. In their exploration 
of different responses to modernity’s violence they contend that
 
if even our relationship to reality is mediated though 
modernity’s grammar, and our categorical ideas of 
what constitute justice are articulated from within 
the same ontoepistemological registers and regimes 
of knowledge that have produced great injustice, 
then it may not be possible to articulate a different 
212
relationship to modernity from within its frames of 
reference (Andreotti et al., 2015, p. 14).
However, although we have, in our thinking, reduced ourselves 
to the Cartesian cogito/conquero, this is just one part of our 
collective existence. Our individuated selves are just one facet of 
the multiple ways in which we already exist in the world, just as 
the Cartesian reason represents merely one kind of rationality. 
This article does not propose that we should somehow attempt 
to try to abolish or suppress the cogito, quite inversely it rather 
proposes that its capacity to take us the edge of our thinking 
has been in general under-utilized. While the cogito cannot 
deconstruct itself, it can be a very powerful tool for taking us to 
that edge. Although it cannot take us beyond the limits of our 
imaginations, it can show us what and where these limits are. 
And if we muster enough courage, stamina and strength to look 
into the abyss created by our thinking, than we might have a 
chance of our self-containment being interrupted.  
The deep learning that happens at the edge, the learning 
from the abyss, is likely to be considered as profoundly 
disruptive of the kind of structures of being we have been 
socialized into, as it is a learning where we are being taught 
by that which is beyond what our reason can contain. This 
requires an awakening (or a re-membering) of other kinds of 
reasoning that are not impossible or non-existent, but are 
merely rendered unimaginable by our dominant ways. Taking 
cues from indigenous (non-Enlightenment-based) ontologies 
this requires (among other things) a remembering of how to 
reason with our other senses, in order to clean up the mess we 
have created. It is not by any means a comfortable journey to 
have one’s onto-epistemic grounds shaken and disrupted, but 
it is a necessary one. As these grounds are inherently violent 
it is about time that we break the addiction to our satisfaction 
with them. Their promises of ontological security and stability 
are empty anyhow.
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